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The total population of Japan will peak at 128 million around 2006 and then 
begin to fall steadily, decreasing to about 50% of the current number by 2100. 
    The total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.32 in 2002. There is still little sign that the 
TFR will stabilize or return to a higher level.   
    Because it has the longest life expectancy, Japan is now experiencing a 
very rapid ageing of its population. The number of the elderly (65 years and 
above) is currently 24.3 million in 2003. It will increase sharply to reach 34 million 
by 2018, remaining around 34-36 million thereafter until around 2060. 
Consequently the proportion of the elderly will go up very rapidly from 19.0% in 
2003 to 25.3% by 2014, rising further to more than 30% by 2033. Japan already 
has one of the oldest populations in the world. 
    In Japan, nearly 70% of social security benefits are currently distributed to 
the elderly. The rapid ageing may put more and more stresses on financing 
social security. Is the future picture of Japan so gloomy? 
    A simple life-cycle model tells us that a higher proportion of the elderly will  2
induce a lower saving rate and correspondingly a lower capital/labor ratio.   
    On the other hand, a population ageing /decline will make the labor force 
more and more scarce relative to capital, inducing higher capital/labor ratio. 
    Thus, there will be two offsetting factors in the process of population 
ageing/decline. If the positive effect through a declining number of labor force 
dominates the negative effect through a reduced saving rate, then the economy 
will still enjoy a higher capital/labor ratio, enabling a higher per-capita income.   
    This  result  can  be  more  probable if labor-augmenting technological 
progress is taking place and if the economy is flexible enough to adjust itself to 
changing circumstances.   
    Such theoretical conjecture is verified by the historical evidence of Italy in 
the 14
th – 15
th centuries. The Italian population decline during that period 
induced a higher per-capita income through flexible shifts of labor and capital, 
bring about the Renaissance.   
    But we have another evidence in Germany at the same age. Here, the 
German population decline induced a weakened economy, which was mainly 
due to the rigidity of labor with little transformation of industry.   
        In short, as far as economic thinking is concerned, a population 
ageing/decline can induce few serious macro-economic effects, if the economy 
is flexible enough.   
    In Japan, we are currently under a sort of pessimism for the future. But this 
pessimism may turn out groundless in the long run. What is missing in present 
Japan is an idea of sound “sans souci”. A higher per-capita income will mitigate 
the difficulties involved in the population ageing/decline. 